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SOME ADVICE ON BICE, NORTH DAKOTA’S MARKETABLEPRODUCT DECISION
JOHN BURRITT MCARTHUR*

ABSTRACT
In 2009, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Bice v. Petro-Hunt,
L.L.C.,1 and in so doing took its position on a question that has bedeviled
major oil and gas producing states: Does the lessee, the operating oil
company, have a duty to bear the full cost of putting natural gas into a
“marketable condition,” including the cost of removing water and
impurities, of processing gas to separate liquids, and of moving the oil or
gas to the mainline pipeline, as part of the implied duty to market? Or,
instead, do royalty owners have to bear a share of these costs?2 The North
Dakota Supreme Court took the position favored by lessees, joining
jurisdictions that let lessees reduce royalty payments by the cost of making
oil and gas marketable.3
The theme of this article is that the rejection of a marketable-product
rule in Bice was based on understandable but nonetheless real and
demonstrable mistakes. The deductions at stake affect the welfare of
royalty owners throughout the state as well as the balance of rights and
benefits between lessors and lessees. The marketable-product issue remains
contested in many other states. Indeed, it has split oilfield jurisdictions into
two irreconcilable camps, for reasons not addressed in Bice. Given the

* John Burritt McArthur is a trial lawyer and arbitrator based in Berkeley, California. He is
licensed in Texas, California, and Alaska and has offices in Berkeley and Houston. He has
handled energy and other commercial cases for thirty-two years and represented producers,
royalty owners, and other oilfield parties. He has served as an arbitrator and as an expert in many
oil and gas cases, including as an expert for the class in various natural-gas royalty cases. Mr.
McArthur, who holds a Ph.D. from the University of California (Berkeley) as well as two master’s
degrees, a J.D. from the University of Texas School of Law and a B.A. from Brown University,
has published dozens of articles on legal and economic aspects of the oil and gas industry. He
recently published a book on implied covenants as mentioned in footnote 1.
1. 2009 ND 124, 768 N.W.2d 496. The background to the discussion of Bice and related
themes in this article is Mr. McArthur’s recent publication. See JOHN BURRITT MCARTHUR, OIL
AND GAS IMPLIED COVENANTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEXT STEP IN EVOLUTION (Juris
Publications 2014). Mr. McArthur’s book discusses the two camps of marketable-product
jurisdictions in more detail as well as other aspects of the duty to market and the other covenants:
the duties to explore, to develop, to protect against drainage, to reasonably accommodate, and to
act as a prudent operator.
2. Bice, ¶¶ 6-7, 8-10, 768 N.W.2d at 499-500 (describing issue in Bice).
3. Id. ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
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issue’s importance, the North Dakota Supreme Court should be receptive,
should an opportunity arise, to revisit its earlier decision.
Lessees receive the lion’s share of the revenue under standard
American oil and gas leases. In return, they have to perform at their own
cost the activity involved in securing production. They have to explore,
drill, develop, and market oil and gas and pay all or most of the costs
associated with these activities. This is why they receive their much larger
share of revenues, traditionally a seven-eighths share but in some modern
leases five-sixths or even a bit less. In a majority of states, as well as on
federal properties, the lessees’ responsibilities have been determined to
include bearing the full cost of making oil, gas, and other mineral products
“marketable.” But, since Bice, this is not so in North Dakota.
Not only do a majority of oil and gas states apply marketable-product
rules, but a majority of oil and gas production in the United States occurs on
land governed by a rule that makes the lessee bear marketability costs.
These costs include making gas physically marketable and can include
moving the gas to the location where it is sold. States so holding are a
numeric majority, even before one counts the federal government, which is
by far the largest mineral landowner in the country. If one counts by
production, most production in the United States falls under a version of the
marketable-product rule. And, overall, the marketable-product decisions
tend to be the more recent decisions. Nonetheless, the North Dakota
Supreme Court adopted the older rule, which, relying on statements in a
handful of law review articles,4 it incorrectly called the majority rule.5 The
court held that lessee Petro-Hunt could deduct the costs of removing
hydrogen sulfide and other liquids from the gas stream and separating out
the dry gas at a downstream plant.6
The great majority of marketable-product cases concern natural gas
because the preparation of gas for mainline transportation tends to involve
more field services than are required for oil. These services include not
only treatment to remove impurities but also processing as part of preparing
gas for market. Moreover, oil royalty clauses, unlike gas clauses, tend to
have a standard term requiring delivery “free of cost” into the purchaser’s
pipeline. Courts often use the oil clause one different from the standard
natural gas clause to define the lessee’s duty to absorb the costs of making
oil marketable. The issues in this article are primarily significant to the
natural gas side of the industry.
4. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01.
5. Id. ¶ 13, 21, 768 N.W.2d at 500-02.
6. Id. ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
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I.

BICE V. PETRO-HUNT: THE COURT’S POSITION

Bice was a class action that arose in the Little Knife Field, which
produces casinghead gas7 laden with hydrogen sulfide in addition to oil.8
The trial court found that the gas had “no discernible market value at the
well”9 because it had not been processed at that point. The class plaintiffs
sued to prevent the deduction from their royalty payments of the cost of
extracting the sulfur and separating liquids from the dry gas.10 The opinion
described the accounting for gas and gas products sold away from the well
and deduction costs incurred to get the gas to market after it emerged from
the ground at the wellhead by the common industry names that apply when
deductions are allowed: the “work-back” or “netback” method.11 The
plaintiffs’ various royalty clauses, though not all identical, were

7. Casinghead gas is gas “produced with oil in oil wells, the gas being taken from the well
through the casinghead at the top of the well . . . .” 8 HOWARD WILLIAMS & CHARLES MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW 132 (Patrick Martin & Bruce Kramer rev. 2006).
8. Bice, ¶ 2, 768 N.W.2d at 498.
9. Id. ¶ 6, 768 N.W.2d at 499. Extraction of the hydrogen sulfide turned “sour gas into
sweet gas.” Id. ¶ 8, 768 N.W.2d at 500.
10. Id. ¶ 5, 768 N.W.2d at 499. The lessee added all revenue from selling gas and “gas
products” and then deducted “certain costs associated with processing the gas.” Id. ¶ 2, 768
N.W.2d at 498-99.
11. Id. ¶ 14, 768 N.W.2d at 501.
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substantially similar and provided for payment on “market value of the gas
at the well.”12
The class argued below that the trial court should adopt the “first
marketable product rule” in order to require the lessee to bear the costs of
producing marketable sweet gas.13 But the court rejected that request. It
decided instead to join the “at the well” jurisdictions in which the lessee has
to bear the full cost burden of getting gas to the surface at the well but can
share all costs after that point.14 Petro-Hunt received summary judgment
approving its cost deductions and on the appropriateness, in the district
court’s view, of the work-back method.15 The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed in a quite brief decision for what appears to be three reasons.
First, even though it described treatises as conflicted on the appropriate
deduction standard, the North Dakota Supreme Court believed that the “at
the well” doctrine was the majority position.16 Rather than citing treatises,
it cited three law review articles, all critical of the marketable-product
doctrine, as evidence of the majority rule.17 The decision does not suggest
that the court performed an independent review of the caselaw before
reaching this conclusion: it contains no substantive discussion of the
individual cases making up what it took to be the majority and minority
positions, even though the court does provide string cites to certain cases in
each camp.18
Second, the court cited one of the same law review articles to claim
that “the” problem with the marketable-product position is a difficulty in
knowing when a product “has become a marketable product.”19
Third, the court found persuasive a 1995 Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision applying North Dakota law, Hurinenko v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc.,20 which, it believed, addressed the same situation as Bice and which
took an “at the well” stance. Although it did not discuss the federal court’s
reasoning, the North Dakota Supreme Court apparently took from that
decision that the term “at the well” is unambiguous and mandates use of a
12. Id. ¶ 4, 768 N.W.2d at 499.
13. Id. ¶ 10, 768 N.W.2d at 500.
14. Id. ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
15. Id. ¶ 9, 768 N.W.2d at 500.
16. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01.
17. Id. (citing Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product
Doctrine: Just What is the Product?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 51 (2005); Edward B. Poitevent, II,
Post-Production Deductions from Royalty, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 709, 716 (2003); Brian S. Wheeler,
Deducting Post-Production Costs When Calculating Royalty: What Does The Lease Provide?, 8
APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 7 (2008)).
18. Id. ¶ 15, 768 N.W.2d at 501.
19. Id. ¶ 17, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
20. 69 F.3d 283 (8th Cir. 1995).
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work-back method when comparable sales are not available as an
alternative source of value at the wellhead.21
This article explores the court’s three reasons for the outcome in Bice.
It finds each lacking and discusses the limits on Bice as far as different lease
types as well as certain factors that the court may want to consider if—more
likely, when—marketable-product issues return to it in the future.
II. MISTAKES IN BICE
The brief space that Bice devotes to analysis unfortunately prevented
the North Dakota Supreme Court from really discussing the issues at stake
and from developing a reasoned explanation for its holding. This perhaps
led to its error in identifying which position is the majority position on
royalty deductions, to the court’s finding a “problem” in an unproblematic
standard, and to its acceptance of Hurinenko’s overly simplistic position.
A. THE COURT THOUGHT IT WAS ADOPTING THE MAJORITY RULE,
BUT IT ADOPTED THE MINORITY RULE
In Bice, the North Dakota Supreme Court mentioned at the outset of its
analysis what it called the majority position: the “at the well” position,
which is often associated with Texas and Louisiana law and one that almost
always allows proportionate deductions for the costs of all services applied
to oil and gas after the wellhead.22 It cited seven states—the “three major
oil and gas producing states, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas,” as well as
California, Kentucky, Montana, and New Mexico—as following this
position.23 The court’s list was preceded by cites to three law review
articles, all authored by critics of the marketable-product rule, that called
the “at the well” position the majority position.24
In contrast to the seven jurisdictions cited as favoring deductions for all
services applied after the wellhead, the court cited only five jurisdictions as
21. Bice, ¶¶ 19-21, 768 N.W.2d at 502. Each side claimed that the term “at the well” was
unambiguous but unambiguous in its own favor: the plaintiffs argued that if the court did not find
the term unambiguous in not authorizing deductions, then it was ambiguous. Id. ¶ 12, 768
N.W.2d at 500.
22. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01.
23. Id. ¶ 15, 768 N.W.2d at 501.
24. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01. This one-sided citation to marketable-product critics
only is a telling contrast with West v. Alpar Resources, Inc., a more balanced, earlier North Dakota
Supreme Court decision in which the court held that a “proceeds” lease does not allow deductions.
298 N.W.2d 484, 487 (N.D. 1980). The West court cited three major treatises, two of which
supported marketable-product rules and one that rejected such a rule. Id. at 489 (citing 3
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 591-603; 3 EUGENE KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS 319327 (1967); MAURICE MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 212-18 (2nd ed.
1940)).
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a “minority” that “have expressly rejected the ‘at the well’ rule and have
adopted the first marketable product doctrine”: Arkansas, Colorado,
Oklahoma, Kansas, and West Virginia.25 Because the court cited law
review articles as authority for its classification of the majority and minority
camps without providing its own analysis,26 it is fair to conclude that the
court did not conduct independent analyses of these cases. The court
presumably assumed that the articles were correct in their tally of the
majority rule. Bice certainly spent no time on the reasons why oil patch
courts are divided into two camps or in analyzing the cases that make up
those camps.
There are a number of problems with the court’s numerology, whatever
its source. First, its majority ranking ignores three states, Michigan,
Nevada, and Wyoming, which have adopted marketable-product rules by
statute.27 It is only fair to count these states because their statutes embody a
rejection of the idea that a term like “at the well” is sufficiently clear to
impose costs on the royalty interest and thus reduce royalty payments. The
inconsistency of these three statutes with the “at the well” doctrine is best
illustrated by the Michigan statute, which was adopted in order to reverse
what the Legislature clearly viewed as an erroneous state court endorsement
of the lessee-favoring “at the well” position.28 The Michigan statute bans
deduction of “postproduction costs” in leases entered after March 28, 2000,
unless a lease explicitly provides for such deductions.29 In addition, the
statute requires that many of the main costs be specifically identified before
they can be deducted.30
The Nevada statute makes the lessee “liable for all of the costs of
production,” bars the lessor’s interest from being “decreased by the costs of
production,” and defines such costs as including services frequently

25. Bice, ¶ 16, 768 N.W.2d at 501.
26. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01 (citing articles in supra note 17).
27. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.61503b(1) (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.115 (2000); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304(iv) (1999). One of the articles cited by the North Dakota Supreme Court
does a good job of discussing the three statutes, correctly sees that these statutes have similar
characteristics to the judicially derived law, and also discusses the federal rule. See Keeling &
Gillespie, supra note 17, at 51 n.194. But the authors’ recognition of the importance of these
statutes does not lead them to change their count; they still claim that “most states” follow an “at
the well,” not marketable-product, approach. See id. at 51.
28. The Michigan Legislature passed its statute after a Michigan court of appeals allowed all
deductions under an “at the well” theory in a lease that provided for payment of “gross proceeds at
the wellhead.” Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 890-96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Schroeder left open whether Michigan would recognize an implied duty to market under other
lease language. Id. at 895-96. In response, the Legislature passed the current statute on gas
deductions. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.61503b(1) (1999).
29. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.61503b(1) (1999).
30. Id.
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provided away from the well such as “gathering, compressing . . .
dehydrating, separating, and storing of oil or gas . . . and transporting . . .
gas into the pipeline for delivery,” though not mainline transportation or gas
Thus, it defines costs that states like Texas call
processing.31
“postproduction” costs as “production” costs. The Wyoming statute
similarly provides that the “lessee pays all costs of production out of his
interest, the lessor’s interest being free and clear of all those costs,” and
contains a definition of the “costs of production” almost identical to
Nevada’s statute.32
Each statute precludes the kind of “at the well” reading lessees
ordinarily claim. It surely is necessary to count these states when trying to
compute the majority rule between states that adopt the marketable-product
rule and those that reject it. If one does nothing more than include these
three statutory states, jurisdictions favoring the marketable-product rule
move into the majority by changing Bice’s ranking from seven to five in
favor of the “at the well” rule, to eight to seven in favor of marketableproduct jurisdictions. The statutory rules do not govern leases entered
before the statutes’ effective dates, but they do express what each state
currently endorses as being the correct rule. Therefore, these states should
be in the marketable-product column.
Second, Bice’s mathematics leaves out the country’s largest and most
significant royalty owner of all, the federal government. Federal royalties
are based on leases that, in turn, use provisions prepared under the Secretary
of the Interior’s discretionary power to implement the Mineral Leasing Act,
which requires payment on the “amount or value” of production.33 Federal
regulations implementing the Act require lessees to put oil and gas into
marketable condition largely at their own expense in a provision that was
upheld in the 1960s, although the regulations do allow certain processing
deductions.34 This early interpretation of “value” required the lessee to bear
31. NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.115 (2000).
32. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304(a) (1999).
33. 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A) (2014) (stating, in general, on lands leased within known
structure of producing field, royalty shall be paid “at a rate of not less than 12.5 percent in amount
or value of the production removed or sold . . . .”).
34. With the Mineral Leasing Act requiring payment under most federal leases on the
“amount or value” of production, standard federal leases allow the Secretary of the Interior to
determine the “value of the production removed or sold from the lease.” For a sample onshore
federal lease, see BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFER TO LEASE AND
LEASE FOR OIL AND GAS, FORM 3100-11 § 2 (2008) (“Lessor reserves . . . the right to establish
reasonable minimum values on products after giving lessee notice and an opportunity to be
heard”),
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/noc/business/eforms.Par.71287.File.dat/3100011.pdf. For an offshore lease, see MINERALS MGMT. SERV., US. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OIL
AND GAS LEASE OF SUBMERGED LANDS UNDER THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT,
FORM MMS-2005 § 6(b) (2009) (“The value of production shall never be less than the fair market
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marketability costs. It shows that the marketable-product doctrine had a
very influential application long before natural gas was deregulated.
When one adds the federal government to the marketable-production
jurisdictions, it certainly is true that the largest part of oil and gas
production in the United States is governed by a marketable-product rule, to
an even greater degree than the count of jurisdictions suggests. The federal
leases and regulations reject a reading that the “value of production” means
value “at the well.”35 Moreover, when one does give weight to this federal
standard, it is very conservative to count a landowner as large as the federal
government as equal only to one state, when no state sources more than a
fraction of the output from federal land. In 2010, for instance, federal land
(onshore and offshore) supplied thirty-four percent of the country’s oil and
twenty-three percent of its natural gas.36 Production from federal land
dwarfs production from land in any single state and even in any small group
of states.

value of the production. The value of production shall be the estimated reasonable value of the
production as determined by the Lessor . . . . Except when the Lessor [decides otherwise in
certain conditions], the value of production . . . shall not be deemed to be less than the gross
proceeds . . . .”). The federal government’s reservation of the power to define “reasonable
minimum values” is of long standing. See Sarah L. Inderbitzin, This Little Company Went to
Market: IPAA v. Dewitt and the Duty to Market Federal Oil and Gas Production at No Cost to the
Lessor, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1167, 1170-71 & n.15 (2002) (citing cases recognizing the power
vested in the Secretary of the Interior to establish minimum values); see also Ross Malone, Oil
and Gas Leases on United States Government Lands, 2 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 309, 340
(1951). The Interior Department’s authority to define “production” in “value of production” to
mean “gas conditioned for market,” and therefore to make the lessee absorb compression and
certain other costs, was upheld long ago in California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 385-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1961). Department regulations require the lessee to bear the costs of treating gas to put it into
a marketable condition. 30 C.F.R. § 1205.152(i) (2010). The rules were upheld against industry
trade-group attack. See Indep. Petrol. Ass’n of Am. v. DeWitt, 279 F.3d 1036, 1040-42 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (upholding regulations denying pass-through of downstream marketing costs, aggregation
fees, and interhub transfer fees, though reversing Department on unused firm-demand charges by
classifying them as transportation charges); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d 722,
727-30 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding regulations that required producers to absorb cost of removing
CO2 from coal-seam gas in order to make it marketable to pipelines), aff’d on other grounds sub
nom. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84 (2006); Devon Energy Corp. v. Norton, No. 04CV-0821, 2007 WL 2422005 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Devon Energy Corp. v.
Kempthorne, 551 F.3d 1030, 1032-41 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The federal rule does allow some
processing deductions. 30 C.F.R. §§ 1206.158-59 (2010).
35. A number of challengers to the federal rule have argued that their gas is marketable at
the well. See, e.g., Watson, 410 F.3d at 727-30. This is the same factual argument that producers
raise in most contemporary marketable-product cases. However, the courts have upheld the
Secretary’s discretion to reject that argument. Id. at 730-31.
36. The 700,000 onshore mineral acres managed by the Bureau of Land Management are
producing 11% of the country’s natural gas and 5% of its oil. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Oil and Gas, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/
oilandgas html. Offshore federal land in the Gulf of Mexico provides an additional 29% of the
country’s oil and 12% of its natural gas. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Gulf of Mexico Fact
Sheet, http://www.eia.gov/special/gulf_of_mexico/.
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The position of the federal government ensures that far more than half
of the production in the country is subject to a marketable-product rule.
The percentage of production that occurs under a marketable-product rule is
even more one-sided because most producing states, including such core “at
the well” states as Texas and Louisiana, use versions of marketable-product
rules in their own leases.37 And some of these states own land responsible
for very substantial production. The land governed by marketable-product
leases in these states pushes the share of national production subject to a
marketable-product rule even higher.
That even state agencies in “at the well” jurisdictions tend to use
marketable-product clauses in their own leases is a compelling reminder
that landowners with large enough interests to negotiate with lessees on an
at least approximately equal basis are likely to expect some version of a
marketable-product rule. These leases suggest what the ordinary lease
might look like if the average lessor had bargaining power comparable to
the typical lessee’s powers.
Even if one minimizes the federal rule’s impact by just counting it once
and then includes the three statutory states, the tally becomes nine to seven
in favor of the marketable-product rule, and this very lessor-favoring count
does not recognize the disproportionate importance of federal production.
If one were to adjust the count by volume weighting production, output
from federal land is so large that the marketable-product share would rise
further even though Texas, an “at the well” state, is the largest producing
state.
37. For instance, of the two major landowning agencies of the State of Texas, the General
Land Office and the University Land Office, both have leases that require, with some variation
between the two lease forms, payment of gas royalties on the gross price for the former and the
gross production for the latter, with some volume reduction possible for plant processing, but also
a specific no-deduction clause that bars most ordinary field deductions. See, e.g., TEX. GEN.
LAND OFFICE RELINQUISHMENT ACT OIL & GAS LEASE FORM §§ 4(B)-(C), 7 (rev. Oct. 2001).
This is in Texas, the leading “at the well” state. For an example from another seemingly “at the
well” state, see the California lease, which requires payment of gas royalties at the current market
price, a price that is never to be less than the highest price in the nearest field for like gas. In
addition, the California lease has a separate, express, no-deduction paragraph. CAL. STATE LANDS
COMM., STATE OIL AND GAS LEASE §§ 4(c), (f) (2004).
It is impossible to compute an exact production share of leases in which deductions can and
cannot be taken because even in marketable-product jurisdictions, leases that expressly identify
deductions will be enforced. Conversely, even in “at the well” jurisdictions, some gross proceeds
and market value leases without any geographic restriction and other leases that bar deductions
will not allow deductions—at least, in all states but Texas, in which the supreme court has
displayed a reluctance to protect even lessors who have the most clearly written no-deduction
clauses. No database cataloguing all of these terms in private leases exists. Overall, though, a
state’s position on the basic valuation issue discussed here is a good guide to the treatment of most
production within its boundaries except on its public (state and federal) property. Thus, it makes
sense to roughly estimate the treatment of deductions on all land within a jurisdiction with the
jurisdiction’s rule, as long as one acknowledges the often significant exception for public land.
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Third, the New Mexico rule was not settled at the time Bice was
decided, but the state certainly could not fairly be classified as an “at the
well” state. Class actions allowing marketable-product claims to proceed
had been certified in three cases in which lessee appeals of certification had
been consolidated, briefed, and argued to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
The court decided the appeal barely two months after Bice. The resulting
Davis v. Devon decision38 properly led commentators to put the state into
the marketable-product rule camp.39 Even had Bice only considered New
38. 218 P.3d 75 (N.M. 2009). The New Mexico Supreme Court had not rejected the
marketable-product rule before Davis, but it had issued a difficult-to-apply but seemingly
restrictive decision about implied covenants on a very odd set of facts in a dispute over a potash
factory. See Cont’l Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 858 P.2d 66 (N.M. 1993). Many
lessees read this decision as making implied duties much less likely. Later, a New Mexico court
of appeals interpreted the term “net proceeds . . . at the well” in a way that many found similar to
the Texas “at the well” approach. Creson v. Amoco Prod. Co., 10 P.3d 853, 857-60 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2000) (citing Texas law favorably). And the Tenth Circuit, although finding that the
plaintiff’s failure to plead a contract violation prevented it from relying on implied covenants,
nonetheless reached out in dictum to endorse Creson and stated the view that “at the well” would
set the deduction boundary in New Mexico. Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP Am. Prod Co., 407
F.3d 1091, 1108-10 (10th Cir. 2005). In addition, the Elliott court favorably cited a Fifth Circuit
case which equated the terms “net proceeds” and “market value.” Id. at 1110. Yet New Mexico
state courts had certified a number of deduction classes, leading to the appeal in Davis. And when
the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Davis on September 15, 2009, close on the heels of the
July 9, 2009, Bice decision, it seemed to have moved New Mexico into the marketable-product
camp. The court did not rule on the marketable-product doctrine as such, but it let the cases
proceed to trial on marketable-product theories, an outcome that made little sense unless the court
envisioned some marketable-product rule applying to private leases in New Mexico.
In Davis, the court was faced with three natural gas implied covenant classes that had been
certified on a “(B)(2)” same-treatment basis, but denied certification under the more frequent
“(B)(3)” common question class. Id. at 79. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the (B)(2)
certification on grounds that Devon had “acted or refused to act or failed to perform” consistent
with its legal duty to the class. Id. at 81-82. However, the court reversed the refusal to certify the
common question class. Id. at 83-86. Had the court believed that under New Mexico law,
standard lease terms do not have room for a marketable-product rule, or that New Mexico
precedent barred such a theory in some way as the lessees argued, it surely would have affirmed
the denial of certification in the three common question classes. Instead, it cleared the way for all
the cases to proceed to trial on that basis as well as on the (B)(2) claims.
It is true that the New Mexico Supreme Court did not rule on whether New Mexico
ultimately will adopt a marketable-product rule. Instead, it expressly reserved this question:
“Thus, the question of whether and under what circumstances the marketable product rule applies
in New Mexico is not ripe for review at this time.” Id. at 80. Yet its opinion contains an
extensive discussion of the theoretical basis upon which New Mexico courts can find a
marketable-product rule as a matter of law or of fact. Id. at 83-86 (reversing denial of (B)(3)
certification and holding that courts may imply covenant by “effectuating the parties’ intentions
by interpreting the written terms of an agreement and analyzing the parties’ conduct, or they may
be stating that a duty imposed by law creates an obligation on one or more of the parties to the
agreement.”). This discussion would have been irrelevant had the court thought that such a duty
does not fit into New Mexico law. Although the court still has not defined its precise marketableproduct rule, New Mexico has fallen into the marketable-product camp ever since Davis. For a
discussion of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s subsequent cases, including the special rule
carved out for certain state lease forms, see MCARTHUR, supra note 1, at 264 n.156.
39. For a thoughtful analysis of New Mexico law on deductions and a prediction that its
state courts will adopt a marketable-product rule, see Judge Browning’s decision in Anderson
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Mexico as being in the marketable-product camp and ignored statutes and
the federal government, its seven to five count in favor of “at the well”
jurisdictions would have fallen to an even six to six. Adding the three
statutory states, the count would have been nine to six in favor of the
marketable-product rule; adding the federal government, too, as one would
have to do if concerned about how most of the production in the United
States is treated, the count would rise to ten to six in favor of the
marketable-product rule.
Fourth, the Bice count omits Alaska, which has been one of the largest
oil producers in the United States since the late 1970s. In Alaska, the vast
majority of oil production is on state land. The federal government has
large onshore and offshore holdings, but most federal land has not been
developed, in part for environmental reasons. As a result, state leases
presently determine the treatment of deductions on most Alaska production.
And the first lease form used by the State has been interpreted to
incorporate a marketable-product rule along federal lines, even though the
State agreed in settlement with its major lessees to allow certain deductions
under that lease form in return for an overall settlement.40 The second, the
current Alaska “new form” lease, expressly bars most field deductions.41
Living Trust v. ConocoPhillips Co., 952 F. Supp. 2d 979, 1012-14, 1022-25, 1025 n.7 (D.N.M.
2013); see also Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, No. IV 12-0040, 2015 WL
1321479, at *105-09, *109 n.77 (D.N.M. Mar. 19, 2015) (including the many-page footnote 77 in
a decision that explains why Judge Browning found himself compelled to follow a Tenth Circuit
reading of New Mexico law that he does not believe is a correct estimate of state law).
40. After oil began flowing through the TransAlaska pipeline in 1976, the State of Alaska
and the major producers on state land began to dispute the price on which the producers should
pay royalties and what deductions they could take. In the course of multi-year litigation, a judge
ruling on summary judgment, after extensive discovery and briefing, rejected the lessee argument
that “at the well” required field cost deductions under the standard Alaska lease form, the “DL-1”
lease, and instead determined that the point of valuation was the downstream LACT measuring
meter. For the rationale, see Memorandum of Decision and Order, No. 1JU-77-84, slip op. at 1218 (Sup. Ct. Alaska Apr. 9, 1979) (Opinion of Compton, J.). The judge concluded that the state
lease had been modeled on the federal lease form. Id. at 21. In a decision thirteen years later,
another judge found “at the well” ambiguous and construed it against the oil companies.
Memorandum Opinion Concerning the Applicability of ¶ 16 to Destination-Market Transactions,
No. 1JU-77-847, slip op. at 12-17 (Sup. Ct. Alaska Mar. 25, 1992) (Opinion of Carpeneti, J.). The
court found that “literal interpretation” of “at the well” would “not be consonant with reason, or
sound public policy.” Id. at 17. These disputes settled in lessee-specific Royalty Settlement
Agreements, which do allow some deductions as part of the larger global settlement with each
company, but, as shown above, the judicial interpretation of this first main state lease, the DL-1
lease, was contrary to the “at the well” rule.
41. The newer Alaska lease form, the “new form lease,” bars at least most deductions. It
requires royalty payments “free and clear of all lease expenses,” including free of expenses
incurred off the lease including but not limited to costs for such activities as “separating, cleaning,
dehydration, gathering, saltwater disposal, and preparing the oil, gas, or associated substances for
transportation off the leased area.” STATE OF ALASKA, DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., COMPETITIVE
OIL AND GAS LEASE, FORM NO. #DOG 200604 § 37 (2009), http://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/leasing/
Documents%5CBIF%5CNorthSlopeFoothills%5CAppendixCSampleLease.pdf.
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Thus, at present, most production in Alaska is, or would be but for
settlement, governed by terms that allow a marketable-product rule. As a
result, and because of the state’s unusual preponderance of production from
public lands, Alaska is best classified in the marketable-product camp, even
though the state’s courts have not adopted a general rule for private leases
one way or the other. The likely increasing role of federal production in
Alaska, both onshore and perhaps someday offshore, will only expand the
marketable-product rule’s sway in Alaska. Adding Alaska would raise the
marketable-product tally as of July 2009, the month Bice was decided, to
ten to six when the three statutory states and the federal government are
counted. The count rises to eleven to six when one includes New Mexico,
in which various deduction class actions had been moving to trial on
marketable-product theories.42
This does not exhaust the problems with Bice’s majority/minority
count. Another factor that should weigh in counting jurisdictions is that
only state courts can decide state law with finality; federal courts cannot
bind state courts on state law. Making clear the limited federal powers in
this area, the United States Supreme Court held, in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,43 that federal courts must defer to state courts on their own state
law.44 Thus, while one can dispute how much discount should be applied to
federal Erie guesses, federal court decisions on what state law means for
marketable-product issues should receive less weight than state-court
decisions on state law.
Of the six state decisions that by July 2009 clearly favored a
marketable-product rule (soon seven with the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s September 2009 Davis decision), six—all but Alaska’s—are
reasoned decisions not only by state courts, but by the highest state courts.
Decisions of at least four of these courts—the supreme courts in Colorado,
Kansas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia—are major articulations of the
marketable-product rule.45 The federal precedent adopted by the Secretary
42. An Ohio court of appeals addressed that state’s deduction rule before Bice was decided,
but did not decide the issue. See Schmidt v. Tex. Meridian Res., Ltd., No. 94CA12, 1994 WL
728059 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1994). The court declined to take a position as a matter of law
because the only cases cited on the appropriate standard came from other states and no Ohio court
had issued a decision. Id. at *3. Ultimately, it decided the case for the royalty owners on grounds
of “usage and custom,” based on the fact that the transportation fee had not been charged against
the lessor’s interest in the first “twenty years or more” of production. Id. at *6-7.
43. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
44. Deference to state courts extends to state intermediate courts, not just state supreme
courts. West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
45. The Arkansas decision may be weaker than the other state decisions. The Arkansas
Supreme Court refused to allow compression cost deductions in a “proceeds received by Lessee at
the well” lease, thus taking the marketable-product position on that term and not giving the term
“at the well” the kind of weight it would get in, say, Texas, but it did not squarely address the
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of the Interior and affirmed by federal courts is also in the direct line of
authority for setting federal rules.
In contrast, of the six state jurisdictions (six when New Mexico is
removed from this camp) with “at the well” rules by late 2009, two of the
rules, those in Mississippi and Kentucky, rested on federal decisions about
state law, and so should have been at least somewhat discounted because
they were not as authoritative as a state-court decision.46 Further, at least
two of the state decisions counted in Bice as “at the well” decisions did not
really decide that general issue. Bice treats Montana Power Co. v. Kravik47
as putting Montana in the “at the well” camp.48 Yet Montana Power was
decided before natural gas was deregulated, before the gas sales market
shifted so fundamentally to a downstream market, and before gas

marketable-product doctrine. Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563, 564-65 (Ark.
1988). A dissenting judge on the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the idea that the lessee bears all
of what he called “post production” costs. Id. at 566 (Hays, J., dissenting) (citing Clear Creek Oil
& Gas Co. v. Bushmiaer, 264 S.W. 830 (Ark. 1924)). A federal judge subsequently refused to put
Arkansas in the marketable-product camp in Riedel v. XTO Energy, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 494, 503-05
(E.D. Ark. 2009). It certainly is true that none of these decisions addressed the point of valuation
in the deregulated gas market, but the Hanna majority’s enforcing the “proceeds” portion of the
royalty clause over the “at the well” term reflects a marketable-product orientation, not an “at the
well” orientation.
46. The federal decision predicting Mississippi state law is the Fifth Circuit’s Piney Woods
Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 230-38 (5th Cir. 1984). The Mississippi
Supreme Court cited the Fifth Circuit’s Piney Woods interpretation of Mississippi deduction law
in Pursue Energy Corp. v. Abernathy, 77 So. 3d 1094, 1099 (Miss. 2011). However, the Pursue
case did not concern royalty owners challenging the lessee’s taking a deduction, but rather the
allegedly excessive amount of processing charges that occurred after the plant had been paid off.
Id. at 1098. Ironically, the plant was the same plant whose costs had been challenged in Piney
Woods. See id. at 1097. The federal decision on Kentucky law is Poplar Creek Development Co.
v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 240-44 (6th Cir. 2011). While the first federal
decision on state law has some value in predicting what the state rule ultimately will be,
particularly if it is a well-reasoned decision, the marginal contribution of additional federal
decisions is limited. Federal decisions may influence, but do not have the authority to control,
how a state court will decide the issue. Kentucky law also includes three earlier state court of
appeals decisions that interpreted “silent” leases to require settlement at the well: two cases were
decided before not only gas deregulation but before gas regulation, with one decided in the very
early days of implementing the United States Supreme Court’s 1954 determination that wellhead
gas crossing state lines should be federally regulated. Thus, all three are difficult to appraise in
their application to the modern deregulated natural gas market. See generally Reed v. Hackworth,
287 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 88 S.W.2d 989, 991-92
(Ky. Ct. App. 1935); Rains v. Ky. Oil Co., 255 S.W. 121 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923). Recently,
however, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that it does follow the “at the well” valuation
method. See Baker v. Magnum Hunter Prod., Inc., No. 2013-SC-000497-DG, 2015 WL 4967131
at *5-6 (Ky. Aug. 20, 2015). The Kentucky Supreme Court did hold, in a same day decision in
Appalachian Land Co. v. EQT Production Co., 468 S.W.3d 841, 843-46 (Ky. 2015) that in the
absence of contrary lease language, the producer alone is responsible for severance taxes, which
Kentucky statutes define as a tax on the “privilege of engaging in” the business of producing oil
by taking it from the earth. (emphasis omitted).
47. 586 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978).
48. See Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 15, 768 N.W.2d 496, 501.
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marketable-product disputes began in earnest.49 Furthermore, Montana
Power was about a regulatory price issue, not a deduction issue.50
The California authority cited in Bice is similarly less than a full loaf if
cited as support for “at the well” rules because California courts have not
directly addressed marketable-product arguments. No California court has
yet to decide a case in which a lessor argued for the marketable-product
rule. Almost all of the pertinent California decisions predate the rise of the
marketable-product controversy, and most involve oil, not gas, and
practices about the sale of oil in the early days of California’s field
development.51 While California’s precedent is suggestive, and the
suggestion does tilt the state toward the “at the well” camp, it is not clear
where the California Supreme Court will end up on marketable-product
issues.
Although these factors suggest discounting the list of “at the well”
states, there is one state that could be added to the tentative “at the well”
count. Bice overlooks Utah, a state in which a 1962 hard-mineral case
suggests that it too may well fall into the “at the well” deduction camp. The
suggestion is muted, of course, because most of the marketable-product law

49. Montana Power, 586 P.2d at 300.
50. Montana Power concerned how a regulated price fits into determining the price
appropriate to a “market value” royalty clause. Id. The court phrased the issue as “[o]f what
relevance are FPC regulations governing the interstate sale of gas to the determination of the
‘market price’ of gas sold only intrastate?” Id. The case had been decided below on the papers,
having been submitted on pleadings, interrogatory answers, and stipulations. Id. at 299-300. The
decision gives no sign that either side raised deduction questions. The court treated the price issue
before it as “resolved” by a series of cases that also have nothing to do with deductions. Id. at
300-01 (citing decisions on relevance of cases over role of federal regulated price in determining
market value and concluding, on issue that was in dispute, that the cited cases proved that federal
regulated prices “are of no relevance in setting the amount of royalty to be paid under a market
price lease”).
The Montana Supreme Court did round out its decision with an aside about a second-best
way of measuring market value by deducting costs from a downstream price. Id. at 303. But its
expression on this uncontested issue not before the court should be viewed in the same way as the
undisputed assumption that costs could be deducted at the well in the Kansas decision in Matzen v.
Hugoton Production Co., where the plaintiffs did not dispute that valuation should be set at the
well. 321 P.2d 576, 580 (Kan. 1958). The Kansas Supreme Court later properly distinguished
Matzen as “not applicable” to questions of where deductions should begin because the Matzen
parties had stipulated to wellhead deductions, when that court issued its leading deduction
decision in Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 605 (Kan. 1964).
The offhand dictum in Montana Power on an uncontested nonissue was hardly a decision
rejecting the marketable-product rule, even though some courts and commentators have cited it as
such. Bice, of course, read Montana Power as putting Montana in the “at the well” camp. Bice,
¶ 15, 768 N.W.2d at 501. Recent federal decisions make the same mistake. See S Bar B Ranch v.
Omimex Can., Ltd., 601 F. App’x 569, 569 (9th Cir. 2015); Emery Res. Holdings, LLC v. Coastal
Plains Energy, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240 (D. Utah 2012). For an example of this reading
of Montana Power in one of the articles cited by Bice, see Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 17, at
51 n.193.
51. For an analysis of the California rule, see MCARTHUR, supra note 1, at 270-74.
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has developed after 1962, and the case is not about natural gas. As a result,
this early case should not fully dictate the Utah Supreme Court’s decision if
a marketable-product case ever reaches it.52
Under any reasonable combination of these cases, a full and proper
count in 2009 would have grouped a majority of oil and gas jurisdictions in
the marketable-product camp. Thus, the majority-rule pillar of Bice should
be pulled out, with the decision then left swaying on two faulty pillars to
which this article soon will turn.
The count has remained in favor of marketable-product jurisdictions.
Since 2009, three courts, two state and one federal, have taken positions on
the issue in states not counted in Bice. Of these three, a federal court
interpreting Virginia law predicted that Virginia would follow a
marketable-product rule.53 The second decision is the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Bice.
Third is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Kilmer v. Elexco
Services Inc.,54 a decision that has been cited as rejecting the marketableproduct doctrine but one that contains little of the reasoning that usually
goes along with that position. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court formally
held that a lease that expressly allows deductions (and would be read to do
so in marketable-product or “at the well” jurisdictions) is not invalidated by
Pennsylvania’s unique Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act (“GMRA”).55
52. The Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning in a relatively early uranium cost-deduction case
suggests that Utah also will take a position allowing deductions if the issue is presented to it in an
oil-and-gas setting. See Rimledge Uranium and Mining Corp. v. Fed. Res. Corp., 374 P.2d 20, 23
(Utah 1962). The lease required payment on “gross proceeds” including any bonuses or premiums
the lessees received, but not any “transportation and development allowances paid or granted to
the lessees.” Id. at 20. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments based on the plain meaning of
terms like “gross proceeds,” provided no discussion in text of the industry meaning of this term,
cited only cases that allowed deductions, and held that none of the terms “market value,”
“proceeds,” or “gross proceeds” prevent a lessee from deducting costs. Id. at 22-23. Whatever
the court would have thought had someone presented a marketable-condition argument, and
whatever the lease language about not having to pay royalties on transportation and development
“allowances” meant, Rimledge is out of step with other decisions in its interpretation that the term
“gross proceeds” is consistent with a net proceeds standard, not a gross standard. Id. at 22. A
federal district court in Utah relied on Rimledge in predicting that Utah will join the “at the well”
jurisdictions, although unfortunately it, like the North Dakota Supreme Court in Bice and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1157 (Pa.
2010), relied on the erroneous assumption that this is the majority deduction rule. Emery Res.
Holdings, Ltd. v. Coastal Plains Energy, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1241-42 (D. Utah 2012).
53. A federal magistrate predicted that Virginia will adopt the first marketable-condition
rule. Legard v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10cv00041, 2011 WL 86598, at *9-13 (W.D. Va. Jan. 11,
2011); see MCARTHUR, supra note 1, at 265 n.156.
54. 990 A.2d 1147 (Pa. 2010).
55. Id. at 1156-58. For the express deduction language and statutory floor language, see id.
at 1150. Kilmer has been cited by a number of Pennsylvania courts and Third Circuit courts, but
only one other state court. Most of these subsequent decisions apply Kilmer to the Pennsylvania
royalty statute and hold that per Kilmer a lease providing for net-back or work-back computations
does not violate Pennsylvania’s Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act. See, e.g., Carey v. New Penn
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The Kilmer decision erroneously assumes that the plain meaning of the term
“royalty” incorporates an “at the well” valuation point and, like Bice,
assumes that this is the majority position.56 Also, the Pennsylvania decision
is unfortunately similar to Bice in giving no detailed consideration to the
reasons for either the “at the well” or marketable-product positions. In
addition, its pronouncement on deductions was unnecessary for two
reasons. First, the court found that the disputed statute is silent on the
deduction issue,57 a finding that should have made it unnecessary for the
court to say anything more about Pennsylvania’s ultimate deduction rule.
Second, the lease in dispute would be treated as authorizing deductions
even in marketable-product states, so the rule the court adopted should not
have affected the outcome of the case.58 In this setting, the court is likely to
face requests that it reconsider the state’s standard on a fuller record than
has been before it thus far.59
Explor., LLC, No. 3:09–CV–188, 2010 WL 1754440 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2010). But Kilmer itself
did not address the circumstances when particular lease language might or might not allow
deductions. Under the logic in Kilmer, at least in general, it is surely now correct that deductions
authorized by the lease should not be counted in determining the Pennsylvania Act’s one-eighth
floor, even when the specific deductions and lease language are different from the Kilmer lease.
See Ulmer v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 4:08–cv–2062, 2011 WL 1344596, at *3. (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 8, 2011). On the other hand, it should be too broad a reading to conclude, as some courts
have, that Kilmer endorses the net-back method under all leases no matter what their phrasing,
because Kilmer only dealt with a lease that authorized deductions. For an example of this broad
reading, see Pollock v. Energy Corp. of Am., No. 10–1553, 2011 WL 3667289, at *5 (W.D. Pa.
June 27, 2011). The author is addressing the Pennsylvania rule in a forthcoming article,
Pennsylvania, Kilmer, Marketable Products, and Natural Gas Deductions: Revisiting the
Unnecessary Issues (forthcoming 2016).
56. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the “majority rule” on deductions by stating
“[t]he Gas Companies reject the relevance of the fact that a minority of jurisdictions have adopted
the First Marketable Product Doctrine.” Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1155 (emphasis added). The court
thus incorporated the companies’ incorrect counting of marketable-product jurisdictions. As the
prior text in this article shows, a larger number of jurisdictions had followed versions of a
marketable-product rule by 2010, some by judicial decision, some by statute, and the largest one
of all, the federal government, by administrative interpretation.
57. Id. at 1157.
58. Even in the most ardent marketable-product jurisdictions, a lease that stated, as did the
Kilmers’ lease, that royalties were to be paid on a one-eighth royalty “less this same percentage
share of all Post Production Costs,” and that then included a specific definition of those costs as
including “without limitation, all gathering, dehydration, compression, treatment, processing,
marketing and transportation costs incurred in connection with the sale of such production,” id. at
1150, would be enforceable.
59. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was only ruling on whether the statutory language,
which puts a floor under the royalty share, limits deductions if they push the royalty share below
one-eighth of the revenue stream. See id. at 1153. On that issue, the court held that the state’s
Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act does not intend to limit deductions, and instead that its oneeighth floor on royalties only applies to the share of the revenue stream at the wellhead. Id. at
1156-58. In effect, the court interpreted the Act as putting a floor under the base price used in
royalty computations but not on deductions that might lower the final payment. Id. The court
could have walled off this conclusion as a mere statutory interpretation without deciding whether
it would adopt a marketable-product rule. Indeed, even the lessee Gas Companies contended that
Kilmer was not the case for the court to decide whether the state will adopt a marketable-product
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Regardless of how one analyzes Kilmer, these additional cases do not
overturn the net counting in favor of the marketable-product rule in 2009.
Bice was in error over which rule was the majority rule and which the
minority rule in 2009, and it would be in error on the same point if issued
today. If a majority/minority count should have played any role in Bice, it
should have tilted the court toward adopting a marketable-product rule, not
away from it.
The point is not that the court should have determined the majority rule
and applied it because it is the majority rule. Such a counting exercise, in
essence a blind following of the weight of precedent across all producing
states to have addressed the issue, is the antithesis of the kind of reasoned
decision we rightly expect from our courts. There are significant
differences in some of the marketable-product rules, particularly the
allowance of certain deductions under the federal and some state rules, such
as shown by a recent decision by the Kansas Supreme Court treating what
appears to be largely a service arrangement as an at the well “sale” that
generates “proceeds.”60 The count may keep changing at the margins for

rule because that doctrine arose in “common law in interpreting ambiguities in leases, not through
statutory interpretation of a preexisting statute.” Id. at 1155. When the Kilmer court phrased the
issue to be decided, it was not whether to adopt a marketable-product rule or not, but whether the
statute prevents use of the net-back method that the lease so clearly mandated: “whether the
GMRA precludes parties from contracting to use the net-back method to determine the royalties
payable under an oil or natural gas lease.” Id. at 1151. The trial court, which granted summary
judgment for the Gas Companies, had similarly phrased the question as whether the net-back
method—the lease’s express provision for deductions on sales away from the well—“violated the
GMRA,” and “ultimately held that the lease did not violate the GMRA because ‘[t]he statute in
question does not prohibit the inclusion of “post-production” costs to calculate the one-eight
royalty. . . .’” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which affirmed,
could easily have limited its reasoning to that dispositive point. And, indeed, when the court
summarized its holding it said nothing about the marketable-product rule as such. Instead, it, too,
discussed the issue only in terms of whether the minimum royalty statute prohibited the
deductions authorized by the lease, not in terms of any marketable-product issues: “[W]e hold that
the GMRA should be read to permit the calculation of royalties at the wellhead, as provided by the
net-back method in the Lease . . . .” Id. at 1158 (emphasis added).
Kilmer is broader than necessary, however, because the court’s route in reaching its
conclusion was not the direct path from its threshold conclusion that the Legislature intended
“both parties’” positions due to the GMRA’s silence on the deduction issues, but instead involved
a deviation into a twisting, roundabout analysis that includes a digression about the term
“royalty,” in reality a broad and general category rather than a specific lease term, having an
industry-specific “at the well” meaning, id. at 1157; for criticism of Kilmer, see generally
McArthur, supra note 55.
60. In Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc., the Kansas Supreme Court held that in applying
Kansas’s marketable-product rule, a field contract with a service company that takes gas at the
well and provides ordinary marketability services but pays for the gas using a downstream price
reduced by the cost of field services, establishes the “proceeds” relevant to royalty payment at the
well. 352 P.3d 1032, 1035-36, 42 (Kan. 2015). For an analysis and critique, see John Burritt
McArthur, Mineral Royalties, Deductions, and Fawcett v. OPIK: Continuity and Change in the
Revised-But-Still-Standing Kansas Marketable-Product Rule, 64 U. Kan. L. Rev. 63 (2015).
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some time to come,61 but the basic division between jurisdictions is likely to
remain.
As a reflection of the raw political power of the relatively more
concentrated lessee interests and the money at stake, the count in favor of
marketable-product rules may be diluted legislatively.62 But given the size
of federal production, most production in the United States is likely to
continue to fall under versions of marketable-product rules for a very long
time even if the state lineup changes. The Bice court’s erroneous
assumption that the “at the well” position is the majority rule is likely to
remain erroneous. This mistaken assumption may be the reason that the
court did not conduct a real analysis of the merits on the two sides of this
disputed industry issue. Bice’s brevity and failure to perform that analysis
is unfortunate because the parties affected by North Dakota’s gas deduction
rule deserved a fully reasoned decision on the merits.
The counting error in Bice also is unfortunate because Bice, in turn,
like the handful of law review articles mistaking the majority rule, has been
cited as evidence that the majority of oil-and-gas jurisdictions reject the
marketable-product rule.63 Such replications are a reminder of the way that
precedent can magnify the impact of statements of error, letting false
counting snowball and distort the path of the law, just as precedential
networks can beneficially circulate and expand thoughtful, insightful, and
correct decisions. Left untended, Bice may continue to be a self-fulfilling
false prophecy and encourage other courts to adopt “at the well” standards
as if they were the majority standard, when they actually reflect the
minority viewpoint.

61. For instance, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently decided a deduction case, see supra
note 46, which firmed up its ranking as an “at the well” state.
62. Deduction rules are vulnerable to political change in either direction. The Michigan
Legislature passed a statute rejecting a judicially created “at the well” rule. See discussion supra
note 28. But in states where producers have more power than Michigan, obviously the political
pendulum may swing further in the lessee direction. Cf, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 902(1) (2012)
(Oklahoma’s recent statute seeking generally to bar fiduciary claims against those operating wells
and performing “any duties owed to any person under a private agreement, statute, governmental
order or common law relating to the exploration for, operations for, producing of, or marketing oil
or gas, or disbursing proceeds of production of oil or gas . . . .”).
63. In S Bar B Ranch v. Omimex Canada, Ltd., a federal court claimed that Montana is in
the majority “at the well” camp in part by citing Bice for its error on which deduction doctrine is
the majority rule and in part by citing Bice’s error in reading this position into a prior Montana
Supreme Court case. 942 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (D. Mont. 2013), aff’d, 601 F. App’x 569 (9th
Cir. 2015). A federal judge in Utah also included Bice in its incorrect counting of the respective
jurisdictions. See Emery Res. Holdings, LLC v. Coastal Plains Energy, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d
1231, 1239-40 (D. Utah. 2012).
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B. BICE PROFESSED TO SEE A “PROBLEM” WITH AN ISSUE THAT IS
NO PROBLEM
The Bice court culled its second reason for rejecting a marketableproduct rule from an offhand comment in one of the three law review
articles it cited. It claimed that “[t]he problem with the first marketable
product doctrine” is incoherence: “the difficulty in determining when the
gas has become a marketable product.”64 The court never demonstrates the
difficulty it feared. Bice did not contain an analysis or discussion of what
“marketable” means, a sifting of any evidence about the gas market, a
thoughtful discussion of the various potential marketable-product standards,
or a showing of specific difficulties in defining marketability. As its
evidence that marketable-product states “have failed to articulate a clear
standard for determining when a marketable product has been created,” the
court just cited to a two-paragraph section in one article that also did not
demonstrate why marketability is difficult to prove.65
64. Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 17, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502.
65. Id. (quoting Wheeler, supra note 17, at 24). Wheeler lists “that it can be difficult to
determine when the gas becomes ‘marketable’” as “[o]ne of the major criticisms” of the
marketable-product rule. Wheeler, supra note 17, at 10. But other than explaining that Colorado
has treated this issue as a question of fact and citing without explanation one other law review
article, he offers no discussion of why this would be such an unusual factual problem for courts or
juries. This is very thin soil on which to plant any part of Bice.
The Wheeler article repeats this point later in the article as the author claims in discussing
Colorado law that “it is impossible to establish an exact formula for determining when gas
becomes marketable . . . .” Id. at 20. This is either not true—the Colorado formula yields a quite
precise standard on which the jury can be instructed— or meaningless, if it intends to mean that
any factual standard for marketability is too indeterminate. And, of course, a court always could
define a standard based on functional categories were definiteness the only important requirement
for a fair rule.
The Wheeler article has other weaknesses. First, it repeats the generic argument that lessees
had to use a vague term like “at the well” because it was “difficult to determine exactly which
post-production costs may arise” during a lease. Id. at 4. Yet it was foreseeable, even by the early
1920s, that such services as compression, dehydration, gathering, and some separation might be
needed. There is no reason a lessee had to avoid listing at least the foreseeable services that would
be deducted if they applied, perhaps with a catch-all “and any other similar costs.” Second,
Wheeler denies that making a lessor’s interest bear service costs is an imposition of “cost
sharing.” Id. at 5. This semantic sleight-of-hand is wrong because the undeniable economic
effect of such a rule is that a lessor does share costs that it otherwise would not bear. Wheeler
may just mean in this point that the lessor does not pay these costs literally out of pocket; the
charges come from reductions in the royalty stream. Nonetheless, they are just as real as any
economic costs. Third, Wheeler claims that the marketable-product rule “does not extend beyond
the boundaries of the lease.” Id. at 9. Not only is this not true, but the jurisdiction that authored
the first leading state marketable-product decision, Kansas, made it clear that this would be a
misreading of its law back in 1964. See, e.g., Schupbach v. Cont’l Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1, 5 (Kan.
1964). Fourth, Wheeler cites Michigan as an “at the well” jurisdiction even though the Michigan
Legislature rejected this judicially adopted standard by adopting a marketable-product rule by
statute in 1999. See discussion supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. Fifth, in discussing the
specifics of individual marketable-product jurisdictions, Wheeler omits the leading Colorado case,
Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1999), two key Oklahoma decisions, TXO
Production Corp. v. State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office, 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994) and
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There is no special problem in defining marketability. Like all fact
issues, the term can be subject to conflicting proof. But marketability
remains a typical fact issue.
Initially, it appeared that the major marketable-product jurisdictions
would identify specific functions—compression, gathering, dehydration,
treatment, processing, transportation—and classify them as per se
deductible or not deductible.66 Such an approach, of course, would not
have presented any difficulty in determining marketability, perhaps except
for a gray area in which parties might dispute when gathering turns into
transportation. But per se categories drew criticism from lessees for a
different problem, namely, that a categorical approach was insufficiently
flexible. In hopes that they could win at trial what they were not winning
by category, lessees sought the very less certain system that Bice used to
condemn the marketable-product rule.
Marketable-product standards have moved away from purely
categorical standards, a change that has increased their flexibility but to
some extent reduced the definitiveness of the standard. Ironically, given
that Bice used a purported problem of indefiniteness as a reason to avoid
marketable-product standards, it has been lessees, not lessors, who
generally have resisted fixed categories in marketable-product jurisdictions.
In these states, lessees prefer fact variable tests because the more factual the
standard, the more room they have to argue that gas is marketable “at the
well” as long as any sales, even to third parties, occur in the vicinity of the
wells in issue. Thus, it is an irony to see a commentator or the North
Dakota Supreme Court using a factual flexibility that lessees in marketableproduct jurisdictions have championed as a reason to refuse to adopt the
rule.

Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Okla. 1998), and the most important
Kansas decision, Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964). Sixth, there are other
marketable-product jurisdictions (as this article has shown), and federal properties with their rule.
Seventh, Wheeler lists as a criticism of the “at the well” approach that it, like the marketableproduct approach, “can often be unpredictable and difficult to administer . . . .” Wheeler, supra
note 17, at 24. Yet nothing makes this an insoluble fact issue. Such problems should raise doubt
about articles like this as support for the court’s ruling.
66. For the claim that in the 1990s Kansas and Oklahoma were classifying cost deductibility
categorically by function as a matter of law, see Owen Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should
Royalty Obligations Be Determined Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically? Part II, 37 NAT.
RESOURCES. J. 611, 664-65 (1997); see also Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 905
n.21 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (citing Kansas and Oklahoma as jurisdictions that “have seemingly
held that certain costs are not deductible as a matter of law.”). As the text accompanying notes
71-85 indicates, marketability is a fact issue in at least most marketable-product jurisdictions. In
general, deductibility turns upon whether services are going to produce a marketable-product or
are applied after one already has been created.
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In addition, marketability is not as amorphous as the article cited in
Bice makes it sound. The legal concept of “a market” connotes active
buyers and sellers.67 It has been applied in many areas, including in
hundreds of oil and gas cases about market value and antitrust cases that
turn on market definition. The factual standard has led courts to reject as
qualifying markets such nonmarket transactions as affiliate sales,68 isolated
transactions,69 and transactions that are disguised service agreements with
the true base price set at downstream locations.70 As far as definiteness, the
standards currently articulated by the four leading marketable-product
jurisdictions are described in the following pages.

67. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396, 398 (Okla. 1970) (“Market rate implies the
existence of a free and open market of supply and demand where there are willing sellers and
buyers.”). In Parry v. Amoco Production Co., Judge Dickinson cited Black’s Law Dictionary’s
definition of a market as a “[p]lace of commercial activity in which goods, commodities,
securities, services, etc., are bought and sold.” No. 94CV105, 2003 WL 23306663, at *11 (D.
Colo. 2003) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 970 (6th ed. 1990)).
68. See, e.g., Tara Petrol. Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Okla. 1981) (“Whenever a
lessee or assignee is paying royalty on one price, but on resale a related entity is obtaining a higher
price, the lessors are entitled to their royalty share of the higher price.”); Howell v. Texaco, 112
P.3d 1154, 1160 (Okla. 2004) (holding royalty owners are owed the higher market value and that
“an intra-company gas sale cannot be the basis for calculating royalty payments”).
69. Parry, 2003 WL 23306663, at *13-20 (providing a thorough discussion of various small
sales, as well as sales that defendant Amoco’s counsel had arranged to give the appearance of a
local market, in a detailed decision issued after a bench trial). The idea that it is not sensible to
treat small, local sales as the benchmark for value of large downstream sales has a long pedigree.
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d 722, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’d on other grounds sub
nom. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84 (2006); Cal. Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 387-88
(D.C. Cir. 1961) (distinguishing “marketing” from “merely selling”). The distinction between just
any sale and one that complies with the duty to market presumably was the logic of the jury in
Rogers v. Westerman, which decided that gas sold at the well was marketable there, but gas not
sold there was not. 29 P.3d 887, 894 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). Judge McAnany, a Kansas state
court of appeals judge, correctly pointed out that given that “there is some point on every such
[demand] curve where somebody would be willing to pay for the item,” the idea of marketability
itself becomes “superfluous” if all it requires is any sale no matter what kind of sale. Fawcett v.
Oil Producers, Inc., 306 P.3d 318, 327 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (McAnany, J., concurring). But the
Kansas Supreme Court, though mentioning Judge McAnany’s point, rejected it as it reversed the
lower court. Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc., 352 P.3d 1032, 1042 (Kan. 2015).
70. The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished the base gross proceeds from the net sales
price after the cost of field services had been deducted under a field-service-and-sales agreement
and required royalty payment on the gross price when interpreting a “proceeds” lease. Hockett v.
Trees Oil Co., 251 P.3d 65, 72 (Kan. 2011). It did not stay faithful to that principle, though, when
this past summer it accepted a net price, not the gross price, as proper for royalty payment when a
lessee entered service-and-sales contracts tied to the wellhead with various mid-stream companies.
Fawcett, 352 P.3d at 1041-42; for discussion, see generally McArthur, supra note 60. The
argument that lessees should be able to pay royalty on a lower price if the buyer provides
marketing services and deducts the costs from the sales price also appeared in a case recently
before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Pummill v. Hancock Exploration LLC, 341 P.3d 69 (Okla.
2014); for this argument, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari 2, 9-10, Pummill, Cause No. 111,096
(Okla. July 16, 2014). But the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the three partial summary
judgments at stake in Pummill for more factual development without addressing the merits of this,
or any other, issue. Pummill, 341 P.3d at 69.
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In Kansas, the lessee “has the duty to produce a marketable product,
and the lessee alone bears the expense in making the product marketable.”71
Unless the lease expressly provides for deductions, the “nonworking
interest owner is not obligated to bear any share of production expense,
such as compressing, transporting, and processing, undertaken to transform
gas into a marketable product.”72 Costs to “enhance” an already marketable
product, unlike marketability costs, may be passed on as long as they are
reasonable.73 Exceptions to this implied duty have to be stated expressly.74
The impact of the Kansas rule has been somewhat limited because the
Kansas Supreme Court has now held that a lessee who hires a service
company to transform its gas after the well and sell it downstream, even
when that “purchaser” only receives a charge reflecting its services, can
treat the net price the company pays after deducting the costs of its services
as “proceeds” for royalty purposes.75 It remains to be seen how service
agreements dressed in the garb of sales arrangements will fare under the
good faith and implied duty standards, which, as the court reminded
readers, the lessee’s sales must satisfy before they can set the price for
royalty payment computations.76 But, in any event, the court did not alter
the basic requirement that the lessee must produce a marketable product at
its own expense.
In Colorado, the lessee must put gas “in the physical condition where it
is acceptable to be bought and sold in a commercial marketplace” and move
it to “a location, the commercial marketplace, where the gas is
commercially saleable.”77 Costs after that point to “enhance” already
marketable gas are deductible.78 In other words, the lessee must pay to put
71. Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788, 799 (Kan. 1995).
72. Id. at 800.
73. Id. (citing Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 866 P.2d 652, 661 (Colo. 1994) (en banc)).
74. Farrar v. Mobil Oil Corp., 234 P.3d 19, 28-31 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (providing a
discussion of substantive Kansas law). The opinion includes the conclusion that “[u]nder Kansas
law, an implied covenant can only be defeated by express language showing a contrary intent.”
Id. at 29.
75. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
76. Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc., 352 P.3d 1032, 1042 (Kan. 2015).
77. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 905-06 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). Rogers
was applied in Savage v. Williams Production RMT Co., in which the court of appeals upheld the
trial court’s finding that gas “was not marketable at the wellhead because it had to be processed
and transported to the pipeline . . . .” 140 P.3d 67, 71 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). In Clough v.
Williams Production RMT Co., the court of appeals affirmed judgment based on a jury’s rejection
of the producer’s argument that the gas was marketable at the well. 179 P.3d 32, 34-35 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2007). The court of appeals also upheld the trial court’s discretionary exclusion of market
evidence about the pre-1992 regulated gas market as too remote to claims about the 1996 to 2004
deregulated gas market. Id. at 37-38.
78. Garman v. Conoco Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 655 (Colo. 1994) (en banc)) (“Garmans concede
that costs incurred after the gas is made marketable, which actually enhance the value of the gas,
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the gas in a marketable condition and location. This standard is likely to
result in holdings like that of a Colorado state court judge in 2003 after a
bench trial: he found the Colorado San Juan Basin gas at issue was
“marketable, both as to physical condition and location, only after
gathering, compression and treatment and delivery to the inlet for the
interstate pipeline.”79
In Oklahoma, “post-production” costs, by which the Oklahoma
Supreme Court appears to mean off-the-lease costs, are not deductible if
they are “necessary to make a product marketable, or . . . within the custom
and usage of the lessee’s duty to create a marketable product . . . .”80 The
court found it “common knowledge” that field processes needed to make
gas marketable include, “but are not limited to, separation, dehydration,
compression, and treatment to remove impurities.”81 In contrast, costs that
merely enhance an already marketable product can be deducted.82 If an
Oklahoma lessee wants to take deductions, it must show that the lease
expressly lets it do so.83
Finally, in West Virginia, unless a proceeds lease very clearly says
otherwise, the lessee has to bear “all costs incurred in exploring for,
producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale.”84
For any lease to allow deductions, it must “provide that the lessor shall bear
some part of the costs . . . identify with particularity the specific deductions
the lessee intends to take . . . and indicate the method of calculating the
amount . . . .”85
None of these standards should pose unusually difficult problems for
factfinders. The facts may be complex, but not more complex than the facts
in many disputes over economic issues. Even though resting on fact issues,
the marketability standards often will lead to the same gas valuation point,
the market area between the processing plant and mainline pipeline, and
thus provide substantial certainty even if not that of a fixed categorical rule.
should be borne proportionately by all parties benefitted by the operations.”). The court further
explained that “after a marketable product has been obtained, then further costs in improving or
transporting such product should be shared by the lessor and lessee.” Id. at 661 n.27 (citing 3
KUNTZ, supra note 24, § 40.5).
79. Parry v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 94CV105, 2003 WL 23306663, at *19 (D. Colo. Oct. 6,
2003). See also discussion supra note 69.
80. Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Okla. 1998).
81. Id. at 1208.
82. Id. at 1205. As a result, “in some cases a royalty interest may be burdened with postproduction costs, and in other cases it may not.” Id.
83. See Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880, 883 (Okla. 1992) (“If a lessee wants
royalty owners to share in compression costs, that can be spelled-out in the oil and gas lease.”).
84. Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 265 (W. Va. 2001).
85. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22, 30 (W. Va. 2006).
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These standards will become, and should become, more definite when
linked to the duty to market’s core value: the lessee’s responsibility to get
the best price reasonably possible.86
Even if the standards continue to be articulated as they are today
without a formal link to the best price reasonably possible, they present the
kind of factual issue that juries and courts resolve all the time. Today these
standards usually will result in a requirement that lessees produce mainline
pipeline-ready gas. As the Colorado Supreme Court has stated, “it may be,
for all intents and purposes, that gas has reached the first-marketable
product status when it is in the physical condition and location to enter the
pipeline.”87 This is the same conclusion that the Colorado trial judge cited
above reached for San Juan Basin natural gas.88 In a recent, extraordinarily
detailed 284-page decision, federal Judge Browning in Albuquerque
determined that the gas at issue before him only came into “marketable
condition when it is of sufficient quality to be accepted into the interstate
pipeline system,”89 although he decided not to certify a class for other
reasons.
C. THE COURT DEFERRED TOO MUCH TO A FLAWED FEDERAL
DECISION
The third and last reason Bice stated for rejecting a marketable-product
rule is a federal decision making an “Erie guess” about North Dakota law.
The decision, Hurinenko v. Chevron,90 involved a “similar royalty dispute”
to Bice. In Bice, the North Dakota Supreme Court found Hurinenko
“persuasive.”91 Yet Hurinenko is not persuasive.
Like Bice itself, but even more so, Hurinenko provides very little
reasoning or explanation for adopting a firm position on an issue as
disputed as the marketable-product issue. It is just eight paragraphs long.
The first paragraph summarizes the case status and outcome; the last, just
six words long, merely states that the court affirms. So there are only six
short paragraphs of merits discussion. Overall, the entire discussion
consumes less than a page. A fully reasoned explanation sometimes can, it
is true, come in a small package. But that is not the case in Hurinenko.

86. See, e.g., MCARTHUR, supra note 1, at 252-54, 262-63, 377-78.
87. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 905 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (emphasis
added).
88. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
89. Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., L.L.C., No. CIV 12–0040 JB/LFG, 2015
WL 1321479, at *6 (D.N.M. March 19, 2015).
90. 69 F.3d 283 (8th Cir. 1995).
91. Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 20, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502.
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The dispute again was over casinghead gas, which could not be shipped
or sold until contaminants were removed.92 The applicable lease language
required royalties paid on “market value at the well.”93 After the North
Dakota Industrial Commission stopped oil production because the oil
companies were flaring associated natural gas produced with the oil, the
companies built a processing plant to capture and market the gas.94 They
deducted proportionate processing costs from royalty payments. The
Hurinenkos, a large family group, accepted deductions for fifteen years. In
1993, however, they sued to challenge the deductions.95
At the outset, one can note that this was a vulnerable position. The
Hurinenkos’ delay exposed them to a sometimes unspoken but vintage
oilfield principle that parties who sit on their hands for long periods of time
tend to lose, whether on affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel or
because courts are reluctant to reward them and likely to find some other
way to rule against them on the merits.96
The trial court granted summary judgment for the companies.97 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed by holding that North Dakota already had set a
“well-recognized,” “established meaning” for the term “market value at the
well.”98 In its view, that meaning is that such value is fixed by “the ‘workback’ method: deducting processing costs from gross sales revenue.”99 This
conclusion would surprise many readers of North Dakota law, and the court
cited only two North Dakota Supreme Court decisions, Amerada Hess
Corp. v. Conrad100 and Koch Oil Co. v. Hanson,101 as sources of the
supposedly “well-recognized,” “established” meaning. The reason for
surprise is that neither case is on point.
Neither Conrad nor Hanson concerned deductions. Instead, both cases
addressed the discretion extended to the Tax Commissioner to seek out
appropriate value under North Dakota’s severance tax statute; in Conrad,
discretion over the Commissioner’s adopting a “workback method”102 (with
no one arguing over deductions) and in Hanson, discretion over oil volume
92. Hurinenko, 69 F.3d at 284.
93. Id. at 285.
94. Id. at 284-85.
95. Id.
96. For cases on the reluctance to reward perceived delay in the oilfield investment context
generally, see John Burritt McArthur, The Restatement (First) of the Oilfield Operator’s Fiduciary
Duty, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 587, 691-93 (2005).
97. Hurinenko, 69 F.3d at 284.
98. Id. at 285.
99. Id.
100. 410 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1987).
101. 536 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1995).
102. Conrad, 410 N.W.2d at 127.
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measurements.103 Bice correctly noted that the North Dakota Supreme
Court had not previously addressed (before Bice) what “market value at the
well” means for royalty purposes.104 Thus, the court at least implicitly
confirmed that Hurinenko was in error to assume that the North Dakota
Supreme Court had decided the meaning of “at the well” in these two tax
cases or anywhere else.
A deeper look at the two cases shows how far they are from precedent
on deductions. In Conrad, the North Dakota production-tax statute at issue
provided for tax payments on “gross value at the well,” which the court
defined as “fair market value at the time of production.”105 The issue is a
familiar one to oil-and-gas lawyers: when the governing royalty (or tax)
standard is “market value,” do the operating company’s sales prices prove
market value so that the proceeds it generates are synonymous with market
value, or must “market value” be computed from “outside” prices external
to the particular lessee and being paid generally in the vicinity of the
disputed property?106
Amerada Hess was selling gas through a thirty-four year old agreement
in which it received only half of the net income its buyer, Signal Oil and
Gas Company, received when reselling the gas.107 In turn, Signal built and
operated a processing plant.108 Thus, Amerada Hess essentially traded half
of the revenue stream in return for Signal’s performing the field services
that many courts define as marketability services.
The Commissioner, unhappy with this low revenue stream as the basis
for tax payments, argued that he had discretion to use prices outside
Amerada’s actual sales contract and picked downstream prices, from which
he deducted downstream expenses in a typical “work-back” computation, to
determine the basis for tax computations.109 The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court, which had approved the Commissioner’s
decision.110

103. Hanson, 536 N.W.2d at 708.
104. Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 18, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502.
105. Conrad, 410 N.W.2d at 127.
106. The Texas Supreme Court authored the leading decision standing for the separation of
proceeds and market value measures of value in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866,
871 (Tex. 1968). The supreme courts of Oklahoma, in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d
1269, 1272-74 (Okla. 1981), and Louisiana, in Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp, 418 So. 2d
1334, 1337-41 (La. 1982), produced the leading decisions maintaining the unity of the two
measures of value.
107. Conrad, 410 N.W.2d at 127.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. For the trial court’s rulings, see id. at 127.
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A striking feature of Conrad is that the court treated it as entirely a
question of deference and statutory construction, not a contractual issue of
lease interpretation (tax statutes do not involve lease issues) or a matter to
which implied duties might apply. The statutory scheme showed that taxes
were to be levied on “fair market value,” the tax applied whether sales
occurred or not, and the statute specifically authorized the Commissioner to
use the “prevailing price then being paid,” not just “proceeds of sale” or the
equivalent for gas of “like kind, quality, and character.”111 The court also
cited what it called the majority oil-and-gas rule that “market value” is
distinct from the lessee’s sales price.112 The decision did not turn on either
deductions or the phrase “at the well.”
Koch Oil v. Hanson was no more relevant to Hurinenko and Bice than
Conrad. Hanson resolved a dispute over whether the Commissioner could
reject Koch’s hand-measured oil volume readings at the well and instead
determine the volume upon which taxes had to be paid using Koch’s
mechanical downstream volume measurements, which tended to show a
higher volume of oil.113 Ordinarily, one would expect downstream
measurements to be somewhat lower than wellhead measurements because
there would be small amounts of leakage. Thus, the higher downstream
volume measurements suggested that the wellhead volumes were too low.
The court, finding that the “oil extraction tax is of a complex and technical
nature,” deferred to the agency and found that the Commissioner “could
reasonably conclude that meter gauging [performed downstream] is more
accurate than hand gauging [performed at the well].”114 Using the meter
gauge readings was a reasonable way of determining “fair value.”115
The court also rejected Koch’s optimistic but somewhat blind (after
Conrad) argument that because it sold its gas in arm’s-length sales, the
Commissioner was bound to accept the value generated in those sales as the
basis for tax computations.116 This argument fell before a dismissive cite to
Conrad and its broadly deferential view of the Commissioner’s power to
determine “fair market value,”117 which rejected just this kind of position.
If it had any relevance, Koch would stand for a principle that the
Commissioner is not bound by “at the well” volumes and, more generally,
111. Id. at 129 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-51-05 (1987)).
112. Id. at 129-30.
113. Koch Oil Co. v. Hanson, 536 N.W.2d 702, 705 (N.D. 1995) (downstream monthly
measurements audited showed “volume gains” over wellhead measurements in forty-six of fortyeight months audited, with a total gain over period of 137,822 barrels).
114. Id. at 706-07.
115. Id. at 707-08.
116. Id. at 707.
117. Id.
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that fundamental values should not be distorted by that geographic
reference. Koch argued that “it is impossible to determine values at the
well when using downstream measurements . . . .”118 The court rejected
this version of an “at the well” argument. But Koch, like Conrad, was not
about deductions, leases, or implied duties, and unlike Conrad, it was not
even a case about economic valuation as such. It was about volume
measurement, not what price or costs apply once one has determined
volumes.119 It would be hard to think of two oil or gas cases less relevant to
Hurinenko and Bice than Conrad and Hanson. Unfortunately, the sum total
of Hurinenko’s reasoning about the “well-recognized,” “established”
meaning of “at the well” comes from these two cases that do not define or
apply “at the well.” These cases provide no support for the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Bice.
III. RELATED ISSUES TO CONSIDER WHEN DEDUCTIONS COME
AROUND AGAIN
One of the strong beliefs of common law courts is that facts matter. As
a result, it is better to advance the law in short, concrete steps rather than by
a leap of rational projection. If the North Dakota Supreme Court does again
face the marketable-product issue, it will be in a better position to articulate
a proper rule—one way or the other—when it has a record before it. The
record should contain evidence about what “at the well” means, how the
field was developed, where gas is sold today compared to in the earlier
regulated market, whether the field was developed primarily to serve distant
demand or local demand, and whether prices that purportedly reflect local
“markets” are true economic prices at all. Beyond this, a few words can be
said about the marketable-product issues generally.
The court certainly will face arguments that the plain meanings of “at
the well” and perhaps “production” mean value set at the well,120 versus

118. Id.
119. Id. at 707-08 (“The Commissioner’s use of downstream metered measurements of the
volume of oil . . . has nothing to do with valuation of the barrels of oil to be taxed.”).
120. See Bruce Kramer, Interpreting the Royalty Obligation by Looking at the Express
Language: What a Novel Idea?, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 223, 253 (2004) (“‘At the well’ therefore
describes not only location but quality as well. Market value at the well means market value
before processing and transportation, and gas is sold at the well if the price paid is consideration
for the gas as produced but not for processing and transportation.”) (internal quotation marks in
original); Scott Lansdown, The Marketable Condition Rule, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 667, 671 (2003)
(“Historically, there was a clear recognition that, under most oil and gas leases, the point of
valuation for royalty purposes was at the well.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); David Pierce,
The Renaissance of Law in the Law of Oil and Gas: The Contract Dimension, 42 WASHBURN L.J.
909, 935-36 (2004) (“If the lease provides for a gas royalty based upon ‘market value at the well,’
the issue will be what was the market value of the gas, at the well.”); cf. generally John Lowe,
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arguments that these terms are silent or at least ambiguous on deductions121
and, in contrast, purpose arguments that the court should be guided by the
overriding purpose of the lessee’s duty to provide a marketable product.
This is the fundamental divide between the two groups of cases. The legal
meaning of “at the well” is dependent upon which camp a state joins. In
marketable-product jurisdictions, “at the well” is not specific enough to
authorize deductions; in “at the well” jurisdictions, the term is, as the label
suggests, treated as sufficient. Thus, there is circularity in finding “at the
well” sufficient to justify an approach before the court addresses which
approach makes sense to it. The North Dakota Supreme Court, though
siding with an “at the well” approach, provided no discussion of why it did
so in terms of the fundamental underlying division. Nor did Hurinenko.
Marketable-product jurisdictions reject the argument that saying “at the
well” is enough to signal an intent to take deductions for services rendered
from the wellhead on. It is notable that, for language allegedly intended to
authorize deductions, the wording “at the well” says nothing at all to show
that it is intended to regulate cost deductions, much less anything about
which costs. For that reason, the Colorado Supreme Court has found the
term silent on deductions122 and certainly not providing clear or adequate
notification of any cost treatment, whatever the reason the term was used.
And, even if one finds the non-cost language ambiguous, as did the West
Virginia Supreme Court,123 ambiguous leases are interpreted against the
lessee, the party in charge and traditionally the drafter, pursuant to the
vintage rule of the American oil patch and one that the North Dakota
Supreme Court enforced in West v. Alpar Resources, Inc.124 It is the failure

Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 244-66 (1996) (discussing “plain terms”
jurisdictions and “cooperative venture” jurisdictions).
121. All of the major marketable-product jurisdictions have rejected the idea that “at the
well” is specific enough to authorize deductions by its own terms. For the Colorado ruling, see
infra text accompanying note 122; for the West Virginia ruling, see infra text accompanying note
123. The author has discussed the Kansas rule in McArthur, supra note 60. For the Oklahoma
rule, see Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1210 (Okla. 1998) (the Oklahoma
Supreme Court articulating that state’s rule in a manner inconsistent with “at the well” doctrines).
122. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 897-901 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
123. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22, 28-29 (W. Va. 2006).
124. For West’s rule of construction, see infra text and accompanying notes 145-48. In West
v. Alpar Resources, Inc., Alpar Resources showed the kind of language a party would use—
although it used the wrong agreement to do so, with most courts rejecting efforts to modify leases
through division orders—if it wanted to authorize deductions when it cited a division order sent by
the lessee to the Wests with language specifically allowing deductions. 298 N.W.2d 484, 486
(N.D. 1980). The Wests refused to sign the form. Id. The proposed but unsigned division order
provided for royalty on “net proceeds” and defined that term to mean actual proceeds minus
“dehydration, gathering, compressing, treating and any other actual costs and expenses required to
make the gas marketable and transport same to the point or points of delivery to the purchaser.”
Id.
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of such terms to say what lessees later allege they mean that led to the
Colorado Supreme Court’s famous (or infamous) observation that lessees
used “at the well” deliberately in order to “avoid directly stating their
objectives in sharing costs”125 and the West Virginia Supreme Court to
accuse lessee producers of using the concept of “post-production” costs as a
code to escape their responsibility to bear production costs.126
The court will face the question of how a changed marketplace affects
lease language that was adopted when a marketable product so commonly
was sold at the well. Natural gas deregulation upended the market in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, as intended, and the major buyer/seller
transactions moved downstream of processing plants. The function of
providing a product, which is marketable in the primary market sought by
most producers, was once fulfilled at the well, but today is fulfilled by
downstream sales after processing plants.
It may be a factor in gauging the significance of this transformation
that most after-well field services, like processing, could be applied at the
well, but not economically. Many of the functions performed to put gas
into marketable, pipeline-ready form theoretically could be handled at the
well.127 But to do so often would be grossly inefficient. Lessees, of course,
Courts generally find division orders insufficient to modify the lease because the purpose of
division orders is not amending the lease but establishing ownership shares for royalty payment
purposes. See generally John Burritt McArthur, The Mutual Benefit Implied Covenant for Oil and
Gas Royalty Owners, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 795, 803-10 (2001). In North Dakota, the
Legislature has prohibited lessees from using division orders to water down substantive royalty
payment terms. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.3 (2014) (“A division order may not alter or amend
the terms of the oil and gas lease. A division order that varies the terms of the oil and gas lease is
invalid to the extent of the variance and the terms of the oil and gas lease take precedence.”). In
contrast to the language in the division order proposed to the Wests, which was invalid because it
was the wrong agreement to try to amend a lease (not because the language was vague or
ambiguous), “at the well” does not tell an average reader that it is intended to address a cost issue
at all.
125. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 899 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
126. Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 264 (W. Va. 2001) (“To escape the rule
that the lessee must pay the costs of discovery and production, these expenses have been referred
to as ‘post-production expenses.’”). Even Owen Anderson, though he ultimately came out in
favor of allowing deductions for services provided after the well, nonetheless concluded similarly
after a careful analysis of the background to marketable-product issues. He found that courts that
rely on such terms as “market value at the well” and “proceeds” as controlling are taking select
terms in what generally are form contracts out of the context and ignoring other lease terms,
including the term “production” and the fact that a finished product is a requirement for “market
value” or “proceeds” sales. Anderson, supra note 66, at 637-38 (“‘[P]roceeds’ and ‘amount
realized’ . . . suggest an actual sale . . . . [F]or there to be a real market price or market value,
there must be a market, a marketable product, a ready and willing seller, and a ready and willing
buyer.”).
127. Some processing can be provided at or near the well, in which case it is called “field
processing.”
See Processing Natural Gas, NATURAL GAS SUPPLY ASSOCIATION,
http://naturalgas.org/naturalgas/processing-ng/ (last visited, July 9, 2015). The Kansas Supreme
Court discussed the lessee’s discretionary power to select the location for providing gas
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should minimize costs, and thus maximize profits, wherever they legally
can. But taking steps to gain economies of scale for their own savings
should not make formerly nondeductible costs suddenly deductible.
In making any decision, the court should be cognizant that the
argument in Bice that field costs can be deducted because there is no market
at the well,128 thus allowing deduction on the theory that the costs are
incurred to increase value, produces the opposite conclusion on the same
facts in marketable-product states. That there is no market at the well
suggests, as does logic, that the gas is not yet marketable. The issue is, after
all, whether the lessee is obligated to produce a marketable product, a
product once often found at the well but today most often downstream.
Marketable-product jurisdictions hold that if it is the lessee’s duty to
produce a marketable product, it has to produce one that can be sold, and
this condition cannot be met at the well if there is no market at the well.129
A related question for the court will be whether marketability is satisfied by
the “first” marketable product, or the product instead has to be marketable
at a price acceptable under the duty to market, that is, the best price
reasonably possible, as this author has urged.130
The court almost certainly will face briefing that touts local sales near
at least some wells as proof that natural gas generally is marketable “at the
well” all over North Dakota. Yet local sales often have problems of thin
markets, comparability, and best-price issues, and they certainly do not
reflect the market for which most of the country’s major gas fields were
developed and in which prudent lessees try to sell their gas. The gas
infrastructure of major gas fields, including large field gathering systems
and long mainline pipelines, was not built to supply occasional free use,
field use, or local heating and cooking. It was built to maximize profits, to
secure the best prices, and to serve “distant” demand from large gas and
electricity utilities and commercial customers who sought processed dry gas
marketability services in two cases about compression costs in 1964. Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co.,
388 P.2d 602, 604-06 (Kan. 1964) (describing facility installation and discussing lack of
consultation with lessor over compressing station); Schupbach v. Cont’l Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1, 5
(Kan. 1964). In each case, the court found that geographic terms of possible restriction in the
lease, “at the mouth of the well” in Gilmore and an identical term in Schupbach, did not authorize
deductions when the services that generated the costs were intended to make gas marketable.
128. Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 20, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502 (claiming that
because the gas, like the gas in Hurinenko, “has no market value at the well, the only way to
determine the market value of the gas at the well is to work back from where a market value
exists, meaning using the work-back method . . . .”). The marketable-product conclusion, of
course, is quite different: because there is no market at the well, “production” is not complete, the
lessee has not finished its implied duty to produce a marketable product, and royalty should be
paid on the value of the gas where it is marketable.
129. Id. ¶ 16, 768 N.W.2d at 501.
130. On the best-price responsibility, see MCARTHUR, supra note 1, Part VI.B.
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in the condition that lets it enter and be shipped in large, often interstate,
pipelines. Thus, it is no surprise to find some courts concluding that gas
becomes marketable only when it is in a condition and location to enter
such large transmission pipelines, not small gathering lines.131
The “at the well” argument also raises questions about preserving the
value of liquids as opposed to the dry methane gas. Over time the liquids
entrained in natural gas have become increasingly valuable, so much so that
today companies often seek liquids-rich gas in preference to dry gas. The
general liquids stream, the “Y-grade” stream, is separated from the dry
methane gas by processing and liquids from each other by fractionation.132
The use of “at the well” to limit recoveries to raw gas would deprive the
lessors of their share of the liquid content of their gas.133 Yet it long has
been the rule that even when leases are silent about minerals not known to
be marketable at the time of signing, lessees have to pay royalties on
additional minerals if the market evolves so that these minerals come to
have separate economic value, unless the lease specifically excludes these
minerals.134 Taken literally, the “at the well” approach advocated by many
lessees would block this mutual sharing of common value.

131. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
132. The Natural Gas Supply Association provides a generic description of these processes.
For its description of processing and of fractionation, the procedure for separating individual
liquids, see Processing Natural Gas, supra note 127, http://naturalgas.org/naturalgas/processingng/ (last visited, July 9, 2015).
133. For instance, a producing lessee is trying to justify a policy of only paying royalties on
a price appropriate to raw unprocessed gas (with no separate payment for liquids), even though it
sells its gas after processing downstream. See generally Brief for WPX Energy Prod., LLC,
Abraham v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1244 (D.N.M. 2014) (No. CIV 12–0917
JB/ACT). The author is an expert for the class in that case.
134. This issue arose in Haynes v. Eagle-Picher Co., 295 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1961). The
plaintiffs owned a royalty interest entitling them to five percent of the market value “at the place
mined or produced of all oil, gas, asphaltum, lead, zinc and all other minerals or substances
whatever, which may be mined or removed . . . .” Id. at 762. There was “no market” for the ore
until it was reduced to concentrates, which traditionally had been sold as lead concentrate and zinc
concentrate. Id. Lessee Eagle-Picher adopted “advanced processing techniques” that let it also
save sulphur, cadmium, and germanium out of concentrate residue and urged that “custom and
practice which existed for many years . . . of paying royalties only on the market value of the
concentrates” precluded its having to pay on these three minerals that it had learned to extract
from the concentrate residue. Id. at 765. The court held that even though the ore may have had no
value where mined, it did where “produced” [thus including off-site processing in “production”]
and holding it “common knowledge that minerals are not separated from the earth in pure form
and that, except in rare instances, some processing is necessary to render them marketable.” Id. at
764. Eagle-Picher had to pay royalties on the three added minerals that its further processing
turned into marketable products. On the question of which minerals are covered from the gas
stream, see also the highly influential helium decision in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds,
441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971).
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Lessees likely will argue that paying the royalty share imposes too
many costs on them.135 In considering this argument, one fact to balance is
that the lessee already receives the lion’s share, usually a seven-eighths
share of revenues, but under more modern leases, sometimes five-sixths.
Such higher shares compensate for the lessee’s added costs, including all
drilling costs and other costs incurred to satisfy its cluster of duties,
including the duty to market. The unfairness argument uses rhetoric that
sounds as if all marketability costs are being shifted to the lessee. Yet no
one disputes that the lessee must bear the majority of these costs; the
dispute is only over whether it can shift a small proportion of the costs to
the royalty interest. The lessee’s greater revenue interest does not itself
prove that it should bear all costs, but it is a reminder that lessors have
given very valuable consideration in order to have the lessee produce a
marketable product and, even before considering deductions, only get a
small part of the resulting revenue in return.
The difference between “at the well” jurisdictions and marketableproduct jurisdictions seems unlikely to be bridged. Instead, the industry is
likely to remain split into today’s two camps, with some variation within
the marketable-product standards. At the end of the day, the difference may
come down to the fundamental interpretative difference that John Lowe
suggested as an explanation for different positions on whether lessees have
to share take-or-pay settlements and prepayments: whether one takes a
narrow plain meaning approach to the lease, looking to the words for
meaning—even if they are vague—but not to the lease purpose as such, or
instead putting more emphasis on the purpose of the lease and reading the
words in that context.136 If marketable-product issues return again to the
North Dakota Supreme Court, these considerations should help guide its
decision.

135. The Kansas Supreme Court faced cost arguments in a recent case in which it reversed
the court of appeals. Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc., 352 P.3d 1032 (Kan. 2015), rev’g 306 P.3d
318 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). Lessee Oil Producers, Inc. advanced a “cripple industry” argument.
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 38-41, Fawcett, 306 P.3d 318 (No. 11-CV-90). It combined a
financial harm argument and what was in effect a due process argument (called a “violat[ion of]
fundamental principles”) in its supplemental brief. Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellant, at
16-17, Fawcett, 306 P.3d 318 (No. 11-CV-90). The Eastern Kansas Oil and Gas Association, an
amicus, made something like a due process argument as a “policy” argument when it called an
implied-at-law obligation to bear the deductions “an affront to freedom of contract principles.”
Brief of Amicus Curiae E. Kan. Oil & Gas Ass’n at 13, Fawcett, 306 P.3d 318 (No. 11-CV-90).
DCP Midstream, appropriately enough a mid-stream company, warns that the decision below
would “increase[] producers’ royalty obligations materially beyond those initially agreed” if the
Kansas Supreme Court does not reverse. Brief of Amicus Curiae DCP Midstream, LP at 15,
Fawcett, 306 P.3d 318 (No. 11-CV-90).
136. See generally Lowe, supra note 120, at 244-66 (dividing cases into “plain terms” and
“cooperative venture” jurisdictions).
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IV. A MAJOR LIMIT ON BICE
It is a mistake to read Bice to mean that North Dakota lessees can
always deduct the marketability costs of natural gas. Those who live by the
word historically sometimes have to die by the word. Those who insist on
plain-meaning analysis sometimes will find they do not like the meaning
the words generate. If “at the well” is a binding, geographic authorization
to deduct all costs incurred after the well, leases without such limitations or
other express language authorizing deductions, be they proceeds or market
value leases, should not allow any deductions.
This issue arose in a proceeds lease in West v. Alpar Resources, Inc.,137
a North Dakota Supreme Court decision long predating Bice. The lease
required payment on “one-eighth of the proceeds” of sale on gas wells
where the gas was sold.138 The lessors refused to sign a division order
calling for lower “net proceeds” payments and expressly authorizing a
series of deductions.139 In that frustrating Olympian impersonality that
appellate decisions can suffer, the opinion did not describe the full set of
costs at issue, but the costs included the expense of extracting hydrogen
sulfide from the sour gas as well as “other costs incurred by Alpar prior to
the sale of the gas.”140
Alpar Resources cited cases that it argued support an “at the well”
approach; the Wests, cases supporting the marketable-product position.141
The court discussed three treatises, the Williams & Meyers, Kuntz, and
Merrill treatises, the “major treatises on oil and gas law,” which it correctly
found “demonstrate the unsettled nature of the law in this area.”142 The
court’s accurate summary of the state of the law in Alpar contrasts notably
with its approach in Bice. In Bice, the court cited articles coming from only
one side, the “at the well” side, of this issue.143 Furthermore, the Bice court
incorrectly treated the deduction issue as at least settling in favor of the “at
the well” position,144 when it has not.
Ultimately, the Alpar court found the “proceeds” lease without an “at
the well” limitation ambiguous.145 “Rational arguments,” it believed, could

137. 298 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1980).
138. Id. at 486.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 487.
141. Id. at 487-88.
142. Id. at 489-90 (citing 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 591-603; 3 KUNTZ, supra
note 24, at 319-27; MERRILL, supra note 24, at 212-18).
143. Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d 496, 500-01.
144. Id. ¶¶ 13-21, 768 N.W.2d at 500-03 (treating at the well as the majority rule).
145. West, 298 N.W.2d at 490.
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be made to support the position that this meant a gross proceeds standard
and to support the contrary view that royalty should be set at the wellhead,
with deductions after that.146 It cited the rule that ambiguities are construed
against the lessee, who usually is “well informed” and therefore has “many
advantages” in drafting leases and “could have easily included express
language to that effect in the lease.”147 Royalties, therefore, were due on
total proceeds, not proceeds minus deductions.148 Nothing in Bice conflicts
with this language. Gross proceeds leases, naked proceeds leases,
presumably naked market value leases, and other leases with no geographic
referent should not allow deductions in North Dakota even if the court
continues to maintain that “at the well” leases do.149
V. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DEDUCTION RULE
ON THE MERITS.
Bice rests on shaky, eroded ground. The court’s decision on the
marketable-product standard is of great importance to this state: to its
natural gas producers and royalty owners, to its investors as well as farmers
and small businessmen, to those employed in the industry as well as those
receiving income from it. As a result, the court should revisit its holding on
North Dakota’s gas-deduction rule when an opportunity arises. In making
its analysis, it should jettison the incorrect assumption that marketableproduct courts are in the minority, and it should not assume that answering
a factual question about markets poses an unusual complexity to be
avoided. The court should remove any Hurinenko blinders before

146. Id. Yet “proceeds,” like “gross proceeds,” has an industry meaning. See Hockett v.
Trees Oil Co., 251 P.3d 65, 71-72 (Kan. 2011) (listing the operative royalty language and
interpreting “proceeds” as requiring royalty payment on “gross sales price”). The term
“proceeds,” used without more, is not ambiguous.
147. West, 298 N.W.2d at 491.
148. Id.
149. Lessees who endorse the “at the well” approach will argue that deductions should be
allowed beyond the well even in gross proceeds leases, unless the lease specifically prohibits
deductions. In other words, rather than require the lease to authorize deductions, they assume that
deductions are always allowed unless prohibited. And, indeed, in the most extreme case, the
Texas Supreme Court has allowed deductions in a “market value at the well” lease even when
more specific language expressly prohibited deductions: the language included a specific
prohibition that “there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor’s royalty by reason of any
required processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation, or other matter to market
such gas.” Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 120-23 (Tex. 1996) (emphasis
added). The majority treated “market value at the well” as providing that all expenses incurred
after the well are deductible, id. at 122-23, but did not provide any plausible explanation for the
very, very specific no-deduction language. The opinion spawned a forceful dissent. Id. at 131
(Gonzalez, J., joined by Abbott, J., dissenting). A four justice minority voted to rehear the case.
Heritage Res. Inc. v. NationsBank, 960 S.W.2d 619, 619 (Gonzalez, J., joined by Cornyn, Spector,
and Abbott, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing), to no avail.
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analyzing the underlying merits, and it should weigh de novo the reasoning
of marketable-product and “at the well” jurisdictions. The court should
consider the duty to market with its requirement that lessees secure the best
price possible; the fact that lessees choose to provide many services
downstream rather than at the well for their own economic benefit; the fact
that most gas fields would not be in production if not for downstream
markets, whose supply is purchased as pipeline-ready gas; and the postderegulation shift of primary natural gas markets from at or near the
wellhead to downstream market centers after the processing plant. It is this
last change that has led marketable-product jurisdictions to bar deductions
in order to preserve what they see as the same general obligation the lessee
always has borne: that of producing a marketable product.

